Region of Iraq and leader of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), claimed that the Syrian war, combined with the fight against ISIS, heralded an end to the "Sykes-Picot era" and called for a new map of the Middle East -one that would now include an independent, sovereign Kurdistan carved out of northern Iraq. 3 According to Bengio, the turmoil and cracks in the Arab societies since 2011 are juxtaposed with "a growing tendency towards trans-border cooperation and unity" in the Kurdish case. 4 Or so it seemed.
On closer inspection, the Syrian conflict actually exacerbated already existing tensions within Kurdish groups. Clearly, at the grassroots level the suffering of Kurds in Syria generally increased the sense of shared kinship within Kurds living in neighbouring countries. 5 But Brubaker argues, it is a mistake to think of ethnic groups as singular entities, and instead the internal organizational dynamics of an ethnic group need to be examined. 6 In this case, increased transnational solidarity at the grassroots group level did not automatically translate into greater cooperation and harmony of tactics and goals at the level of Kurdish political elites. Instead, examining the internal dynamics reveals increased division at an elite level as competing political projects and struggles emerged across different Kurdish groups.
The differences between Iraqi Kurdish leaders, on the one hand, and Turkish and Syrian Kurdish leaders, on the other, in their visions of the rightful future of Kurds in the Middle East has become increasingly stark since 2011. While in Iraq there were increased demands for independence, the calls were more modest in Turkey and Syria and appealed instead for federalism and autonomy. Turkey's Kurdish leaders actually criticised Iraqi
Kurdish demands for an independent state. Cemil Bayık, one of three members of the PKK executive council, warned against partitioning Iraq, declaring that it would strengthen ISIS, and therefore Kurds should be satisfied with autonomy within a unified Iraq. 7 At the same time, the Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani demanded that Syrian Kurds throw in their lot with other anti-Assad opposition groups rather than pressurizing the unity of Syria by looking for regional autonomy. 8 Rather than binding Kurds into some kind of mythical homogenous group, the war added momentum to related but distinct projects in each of the three states, thus increasing competition within and among these groups. As such, it would be a mistake to think of the Syrian war as inevitably advancing the idea of a unified Kurdish self-rule across the region.
In many respects, it has hampered such aspirations by exposing the heterogeneity of the Kurdish population and the competing interests of different Kurdish leaders. While deepening connections between the PKK in Turkey and PYD (Democratic Union Party) in Syria are observable, the war exposed the competing interests and characteristics of the two distinct Kurdish projects of the PKK and KDP, the most powerful and influential Kurdish parties in the Middle East.
Prior to outlining the impact of the Syrian war on pushes for Kurdish selfdetermination, it is worth briefly outlining the relationship between different Kurdish groups prior to the outbreak of the conflict.
RELATIONS BETWEEN KURDISH ELITES PRIOR TO SYRIAN CONFLICT
Although our argument is that the Syrian conflict exacerbated intra-Kurdish divisions at the elite level, it should be noted that these tensions did not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, divisions between different Kurdish factions in the Middle East have a long history. A complete overview of this process is beyond the scope of the paper, however, to establish context it is worth briefly noting some of these more prominent divisions. Current divisions between rival Kurdish leaders were initially formed in the 1970s, with the proliferation of also engaged in activities across borders.
The desire for control and influence across the region has been the key driver of tension between these groups, which has even led to intra-Kurdish armed conflict in the past.
The most fragile of the relationships between Kurdish political parties at the regional level is the one between the PKK and KDP (and, to a somewhat lesser extent today, between the PKK and the PUK A progressive rhetoric is also adopted by the PKK and HDP (People's Democratic Party) in Turkey and the PYD in Syria. In the Turkish general elections in 2015, the HDP adopted an inclusive political agenda based on democratic freedoms, gender equality and environmentalism, and this expanded their electoral base in the June general election. 12 The thinking was that an increase in democratic rights for all in Turkey would inevitably improve the position of the Kurds most of all. The HDP also practices gender equality, having adopted a gender-balanced co-leadership at all levels of party management. The same co-leadership principle has been adopted by the PYD, which presents itself as a pluralist and democratic party, inclusive of other Kurdish factions within Syria as well as different ethnic and religious groups. 13 This is the result of its effort to increase its legitimacy among the population it controls and within international society. In Iraq, Kurds pointed to the government's inability to provide peace and stability and increased their demand for independent statehood and plans for holding a referendum.
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Moreover, the KRG continued to sell crude oil to international markets, despite Baghdad's opposition, based on the claim of a right to oil within their territory. The KRG also benefited from the vacuum created by ISIS's attacks and the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces from the Kirkuk area, moving its Peshmerga forces into those areas. In this way, the discourse of self-determination and its associated rights was given further momentum relative to the state.
Kurds at the Regional Level
From the beginning of the conflict, some Kurdish political leaders engaged in unprecedented collaboration and solidarity was boosted at the community level. One of the most significant examples was seen in the siege of Kobani and its aftermath. As this brief summary shows, it would be a mistake to claim that the Syrian war did not result in any increased sense of kinship or cooperation whatsoever between Kurdish leaders in different countries. Kurdish leaders from all states used a rights-based discourse to try and advance their claims to self-determination and military cooperation was also evident by Kurds throughout the region. Yet ultimately, there were limits to the level of leadership harmonisation across the regions Kurds.
MOVING FURTHER APART
The opportunities for Kurds discussed above were high points that were not The uprisings and conflict in Syria were a turning point for its Kurdish population.
The weakening of the state's authority presented opportunities to Kurds to pursue their interests. After the start of the war, the regime's forces partly withdrew from northern Syria, leading many to believe a tacit agreement not to fight each other had been struck between the Kurds and Assad. But as the authority and capacity of the state came under sustained attack, this restricted Damascus's ability to resist Kurdish progress towards self-rule or to strike bargains with the Kurds. By 2012, Kurds led by the PYD began taking control of territory they call Rojava or Western Kurdistan (see below for full discussion of significance of Rojava). Although Rojava is undoubtedly an important development, its position remains precarious. 25 As the Assad regime gains leverage in the war against opposition groups, pressure on the YPG has increased. 26 Moreover, the Syrian regime has not given up its full sovereignty in northern Syria. It has continued to pay the salaries of its public employees, and many Syrian state structures continue to receive their budgets from the government, weakening the Kurdish authorities' legitimacy. 27 Rojava is far from consolidated as a political entity.
In Iraq, however, Kurds have a more secure position, and the government in Baghdad struggles to contain their increasing assertiveness and growing power. 28 In fact, from the KRG's perspective, the main threat to its stability is ongoing tension with Baghdad. The increasing weakness of the federal government and the rising sectarianism that is crippling the state have opened up the possibility of independence. In addition, a lack of budget transfers from Baghdad and the bad management of federal economic resources have put a heavy burden on the KRG's ability to maintain satisfactory day-to-day governing. 29 For Barzani and his KDP, the Syrian war, combined with ongoing sectarian violence in Iraq and the rise of ISIS, has offered an opportunity to realize formal independence. Barzani repeatedly stated his desire to hold a non-binding referendum on the issue.
For Turkey, in some respects, the foundation of the state created the fault lines for the conflict with its Kurdish population. The Turkish state hinged on two core principles that run through its security policy to this day: the state should be secular (a principle somewhat in flux under the ruling AKP) and unitary. 30 The PKK, which was formed in 1978, emerged at the vanguard of a revival of Kurdish politics in the 1970s and began to carry out armed attacks against Turkish security forces in 1984. 31 The response from the state, which quickly became the entrenched approach of successive governments, has been to confront the PKK militarily and to suppress and proscribe Kurdish political activism. This is not to say that there have been no attempts at rapprochement, but the militancy of the PKK and the limited concessions the state has been willing to offer have led to the failure of such attempts. Attempts by Turkey to resist the Kurdish transnational dimension extended beyond its borders. Turkey remains deeply reluctant to see a continuous Kurdish belt along its border and has lobbied hard to restrict a self-governed Kurdish area from emerging in Syria in addition to the already existing one in northern Iraq. Ankara tried to increase its influence in northern Syria by calling for an intervention to carry out military operations, ostensibly against radical Islamists but, in effect, focused on the PKK and PYD. 33 It also sought to shape the Kurdish political landscape in Syria and used its leverage with Kurdish parties in Iraq to limit the possibilities for the PKK. Somewhat unexpectedly, Turkey has long found the Kurdistan Region of Iraq an acceptable political unit and viewed it with enthusiasm as a trading partner. 34 Turkish acceptance of the region is further reinforced by the fact that a powerful KRG in Iraq poses a challenge to the PKK's hegemony over Kurdish nationalism by offering an alternative source of leadership. 35 However, there are ongoing Turkish concerns about the potential for such an autonomous region to inspire the push for independence within its own Kurdish population.
In order for the KDP to realize its ambition of gradually moving towards separation and international recognition, it needs to reassure Turkey that this will not pose a threat to its territorial integrity. To do this, the KDP in Iraq strives to ensure that it does not upset
Turkey. The KRG takes its decisions about relations with other Kurdish factions on
Turkey's terms. 36 For example, the KRG needed Turkey's approval to send its Peshmerga to
Kobani. In order to not jeopardize its own relationship with Turkey, which it needs for its long-term plan for eventual separation, the KDP was lukewarm towards Rojava. Indeed the KDP almost implicitly adopted a stance that was closer to that of the Turkish government than that of Kurds in Syria and Turkey.
The net result is that the different states' capacities to resist Kurdish pushes for selfdetermination increase intra-Kurdish tensions across the different leadership cohorts. While the PKK and PYD both adopt an approach of pursuing democratic confederalism within the existing states' borders (with Syrian Kurds coming much closer to realising this than Turkey's Kurds), Iraqi Kurdish leaders pursue a project of partition and independence. The starkest fault line within the Kurdish community in the Middle East is that between the KDP and the PKK, the two most powerful rivals for Kurdish regional leadership. Their rivalry has always been one of the key characteristics of Kurdish politics.
Today the ideational aspect is also becoming prominent. The two groups have different visions for the future of the Kurds within each state as well as in the region as a whole and for how Kurds should govern themselves.
The emergence of Rojava served as a catalyst for making the division starker.
Through the Syrian war, PYD was able to carve a zone of control in northern Syria and transform it into a de facto autonomous region. This was possible due to the existing crossborder links between the PKK and the Syrian Kurds. The PKK has been developing transnational links with Kurds in Turkey's neighbouring countries for decades. 38 However, the emergence of Rojava, has not only made such links even more tangible, it also manifested Öcalan's political ideology in practice as opposed to the Iraqi Kurdish model.
The PYD tends to share the vision of the PKK, whose leaders strongly endorse the Rojava experiment and whose supporters hold it up as a living example of Öcalan's notion of "democratic confederalism," a system he proposed as a way to provide Kurds with selfrule while still respecting existing borders. 39 From this perspective, Rojava is seen as the beginning of the adoption and implementation of this governing system in other parts of the Middle East. 40 Before Rojava, Öcalan's ideology and system of democratic confederalism was just an idea that was limited to the way the PKK and its affiliated parties ran their affairs. However, the emergence of Rojava, its ability to survive for four years and, most argued that Syria's Kurds should join the heterogeneous official opposition. 41 The KNC also received endorsements from Arab opposition groups and the Turkish government. However, the PYD parted ways with it and emerged with a different understanding of the situation on the ground. 42 Turkey, fearful of what this meant for its interests, put pressure on the PYD to remain part of the KNC and blamed the PYD for not cooperating. 43 The PYD chose a third way, not taking part in the opposition or pro-Assad groups, and later pulling various like- 
